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Born in Budapest, Hungary,
Stevan Harnad is professor at
the Department of Psychology at
Universite´ du Que´bec a´ Montre´al,
holding the Canada Research
Chair in Cognitive Sciences
and is also Affiliate Professor in
Electronics and Computer Science
at University of Southampton,
UK. He did his undergraduate
work at McGill University and his graduate work at
Princeton University. His research is on categorisation,
communication and cognition and the open research
web. KI interviewed him about Symbol Grounding on
August 19, 2012.
KI: What inspired you to propose symbol grounding
as a novel concept?
From 1978-2003 I was editor of the journal
Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS), the journal in
which computationalism - the thesis that cognition
is computation - was beginning to become more
important and influential. I too was impressed
by the progress that artificial intelligence was
making in generating and explaining our behavioral
capacities computationally, especially compared to the
empty decades of behaviorism, and in the face of
neuroscience’s failure to explain how our brains manage
to generate our behavior. With what came to be called
the “Turing Test” (TT), Alan Turing seemed to have
defined the agenda for cognitive science - design a
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model that can do whatever we human cognizers can
do, and you have explained how it can be done - and
computation looked like the way to design the model.
But then in 1980 the philosopher John Searle
published what was to become his influential critique
of computationalism, the “Chinese Room Argument”,
a thought-experiment in which he pointed out that if
there were a purely computational model that could
pass the TT - i.e., communicate by email with humans,
indistinguishably from a human, for a lifetime - then,
if the computer program could pass the TT in Chinese,
Searle himself, who does not understand Chinese, could
memorize and execute all the computations too, while
still not understanding Chinese. Hence computation
alone cannot generate understanding. So cognition
cannot be just computation.
What is missing? As Alan Turing showed
in his epochal work, computation is formal
symbol-manipulation - reading and writing symbols
based on rules that operate only on the arbitrary
shapes of the symbols (whether 0’s and 1’s or the
words of a natural language) not on their meanings.
So where does the meaning of symbols come from?
My version of this impasse was the Chinese-Chinese
dictionary-go-round: How can one learn the meanings
of Chinese words from a Chinese-Chinese dictionary
alone? Everything is defined there, but the definitions
are meaningless unless you already know what some of
them, at least, mean. How to “ground” the meanings
of those symbols, so the rest of them can be defined
and described through words alone? That is what I
dubbed the “symbol grounding problem”.
The natural candidate for grounding symbols is
direct sensorimotor interaction with the things the
symbols refer to, so that the grounded symbol
system can recognize manipulate and name them,
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autonomously. These are not just verbal email
capacities: they are sensorimotor robotic capacities.
And they are not just computational. Sensorimotor
transduction is not computation; it is physical
dynamics. And a good deal more dynamics are likely
to be needed to pass the grounded robotic version of
the TT, rather than just the symbolic email version.
To categorize is to do the right thing with the
right kind of thing. The focus of my research has
since been on how we acquire categories - first the
ones that are grounded through direct sensorimotor
induction, and then the ones we can learn via
verbal instruction, through definition, description and
explanation. Symbol grounding is also the necessary
condition for the evolution of language, but language
has to be grounded in the capacity to acquire some
categories, at least, directly, through the senses,
rather than indirectly, through language. (How many
categories are needed to ground language - and which
ones - is another question. So is the question of how
learning to categorize things might change the way
they look to us; this is called “categorical perception”
and is a special case of the “Whorf Hypothesis” that
experience and language can influence the way we
perceive the world).
KI: How do you see that the field has progressed
since your first formulation of symbol grounding?
It is now widely accepted that although
computation is an essential tool in studying and
modeling cognition, and it is also a potentially powerful
and important component of cognition, cognition is
not and cannot be just computation. Computation
is hardware-independent symbol-manipulation; but
there are many potentially important components
of cognition that are not hardware-independent
computation but dynamical, physical processes, such
as sensorimotor transduction, analog structures and
processes, even biochemical and molecular ones.
The widening of the Turing Test from the
original purely symbolic version to the robotic
Turing Test has opened the door to “situated”
robotics, “embodied” and “embedded” cognition, and
also parallel/distributed and other forms of analog
processing. It has also deepened the study of the
interface between nonverbal and verbal cognitive
function.
A still-open question is how relevant and helpful
neuroscientific data will be in explaining cognition.
There is no question that the brain does it all. And
also that much of brain activity is not computational
(though like almost everything, it can be approximated
and simulated computationally). But it is not clear
which features of brain function are relevant to
cognition, and how they cause cognition. It is still the
robotic version of the TT that must be the arbiter
not only of what is relevant, but of what is successful
in causing cognition - which means: in generating the
capacity to do all the things that human cognizers can
do.
KI: How do you see the symbol grounding problem
in the context of the recent trends in the semantic web
and internet of things?
The semantic web is not really a semantic web!
It is just a syntactic web, just as all computation
is (meaningless symbols, manipulated on the basis
of their shapes). What makes people want to call
it (erroneously) “semantics” is the fact that human
cognizers have tagged some of the symbols in the web
with further symbols of their own, whose meanings
we all understand. But that is not grounded meaning
(semantics). It remains just as parasitic on the
(grounded) meanings in the brains of its users (human
cognizers) as Searle’s Chinese pen-pal Turing Test does.
Another new web-inspired notion - alongside
embodied cognition and situated cognition - is
“distributed cognition”: the notion that cognitive states
may not just occur within the heads of cognizers, but
might somehow be distributed across many heads, as
well as across their external tools, including the web.
I think this is nonsense. What it forgets and leaves
out is also what Turing left out: Cognitive states are
not just action-capacity states, generating all of our
doings; they are also felt states. It feels like something
to cognize. Cognition would be trivially distributed if
all there was in the world was doings. Then it would
be arbitrary, in the Turing Test, what we designated as
being the robot, and what we designated as being the
rest of the world. But the reason it is not that arbitrary
is because cognizers feel. And the notion that there
is a further feeling entity, wider than the head of an
individual human cognizer (or TT-passing robot), that
likewise “cognizes”, is as unlikely as the notion that
there is a further feeling entity, wider than the head
of an individual human cognizer, that likewise feels a
headache - or that the web that told me that my grant
was not funded is part of the headache that it induced
in me.
The problem of explaining how and why cognizers
can do what they can do (Turing’s problem) has come
to be called the “easy” problem of cognitive science
(even though it is far from easy, and we are from solving
it), in order to contrast it with what has been called the
“hard” problem of cognitive science, which is to explain
how and why cognizers feel. About the hard problem
all I can say is that the Turing Test certainly cannot
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test it, and symbol grounding certainly does not solve
it.
The year 2012 is Alan Turing’s year. In honor of
the centenary of Turing’s birth, over fifty speakers at
an international, interdisciplinary Summer Institute on
the Evolution and Function of Consciousness tried to
address the hard problem that defies Turing testing and
symbol grounding.
KI: Communication is an important aspect in
symbol learning through sharing. Clark proposes that a
common ground of shared beliefs and intentions can be
achieved between two communication partners through
a specific communication protocol, involving attention,
signal decoding and understanding and, finally, the
creation of joint projects. In this sense common
ground is achieved when both interaction partners
agree that they have reached mutual understanding.
However, communication - at least in the real world
- is noisy, as is the representation (or grounding) of
concepts or symbols. How (much) does communication
change the meaning of symbols? I.e. how do noisy
transmission channels (which may possibly lead to
misunderstandings) on the one hand and slightly
different concepts on the other hand affect the meaning
as it is constituted within an interaction and how does
this affect the representation of a symbol?
I regret that this question is too vague to
answer, except to say that, yes, language allows us
to communicate, sharing not only symbols (words)
but meanings (as long as enough of the words are
grounded in the sensorimotor experience of sender and
receiver). And, yes, noise and error can distort both
symbol transmission and meaning. And of course if the
grounding of the symbols is different for the sender
and the receiver, the intended meaning may not be
transmitted: If my meaning of “apple”was grounded
only on round, red apples, and you tell me that you
ate a fruit the color of grass, I will assume, wrongly,
that it was not an apple.
But all categories are approximate (just as a picture
is always worth not just more than 1000 words but more
than an infinite number of words) and all categories
(other than purely formal ones) are also provisional. In
the apple example I just gave, I would have to learn -
either from direct sensorimotor induction or from verbal
(symbolic) instruction - that there are green apples too.
That would resolve the communicative confusion.
Most of cognition is like that: an ongoing
process of resolving the confusion among confusable
alternatives, guided either by the direct error-correcting
consequences of categorizing and miscategorizing
(doing the right or wrong thing with the right or wrong
kind of thing) or - if you are an organism or robot that
has language - guided by (grounded) verbal instruction.
KI: One research trend in robotics focusses on
emotions as motivational foundation for action,
perception and learning. How would you say do
emotions affect symbol grounding processes?
Interpreting robotic processes or activities as
emotional is as groundless as interpreting ungrounded
symbols as meaningful: The problem of explaining
emotions is just a particular case of the “hard” problem
of explaining how and why we feel, rather than just do.
Motivation is much easier, because it can be treated
as purely behavioral and functional - even a thermostat
can have “goals” - as long as we leave out the (hard)
fact that it feels like something to have a goal!
KI:What do you see as the challenges for the future
regarding SG?
Scaling up today’s toy robots to be able to pass the
full-scale TT. Almost all the hard work still remains
to be done, and no really revolutionary ideas are yet
on the horizon. (We can keep on plodding with vastly
over-interpreted toy robots that we call “grounded”,
but grounding only becomes meaningful and significant
at full human scale, and that means the full power of
human language - plus all that nonverbal capacity that
grounds language.)
KI: Which of your current and past projects
would you consider the most successful or the biggest
milestone?
I don’t think there have been any substantive
milestones in cognitive science yet, other than Turing
computation itself, and perhaps also Chomsky’s
Universal Grammar.
KI: What are the scientific issues that you are
currently working on today?
My research group measures and models how
humans learn new categories from direct experience
and from words. We also analyze dictionaries for the
properties of the smallest number of words from which
all the rest can be defined by words alone. And I never
miss an opportunity to point out how and why new
(and old) attempts to solve the “hard” problem keep
failing.
KI: We know you are a promoter of open access,
what are your main motivations in this respect?
I waste an awful lot of time trying to persuade
researchers to make their refereed research freely
accessible on the web (and to persuade researchers’
institutions and funders to mandate [require] that
they make their refereed research freely accessible on
the web), in order to maximize the uptake, usage,
applications, impact and progress of research, to the
benefit of researchers, their institutions, the R&D
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industries, and the tax-paying public that fund the
research and for whose benefit it is being conducted.
The web is not distributed cognition, but it has
become our “Cognitive Commons” - the place where
all the categories collectively acquired by generations
of scholarly and scientific research are stored, used and
shared.
I say time is being wasted because what I am
preaching is trivial and ought to be self-evident.
It’s not rocket science but “raincoat science” as in:
“Look kids, it’s raining outside. Time to put on
raincoats.” Countless groundless worries have given rise
to a syndrome that I’ve provisionally dubbed “Zeno’s
Paralysis” (but that historians will eventually have to
explain): It is taking an unbelievably long time for most
researchers to get round to doing the few keystrokes per
paper it takes to make them all open access.
KI: Finally, which question should I have asked you
and what would have been the answer to it?
You should have asked me about the relation
between the symbol grounding problem and the “hard”
problem of consciousness, but I have already managed
to slip in both the question and the answer above!
KI: Stevan, thank you very much for your time and
for this interview.
